For consumer class action attorneys like myself, we can continue to count our blessings for the moment. Indeed, a number of courts across the country continue to make commonsense and carefully crafted opinions that confer Art III standing for statutory damages claims.
I have much faith in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The panel just heard oral arguments, as the U.S. Supreme Court had remanded Spokeo (back on Dec. 13th). The 9th Cir.’s new challenge is to tackle the concreteness requirement with newfound gusto. Judge O’Scannlain found it difficult to move past her view that Mr. Robin’s allegations (the resulting inability to find work because of a grossly incorrect report about him) were ostensibly sufficiently concrete, tangible harm. However, Counsel for Plaintiff, William Consovoy kept focus on the issue that the Spokeo court harped on: Defendant was making this about an apparently intangible harm that has yet to run through the rigors of a concreteness test as the one that Alito pieced apart in his majority opinion…
Well, hang tight, as the panel will render its decision in the early portion of next year. From that, we’ll get more guidance about what that court thinks is needed to satisfy Art. III standing requirements…
We have some phenomenal judges, such as Judge Lucy Koh in the N.D. of CA in the 9th Circuit. She recently decided the Matera v. Google case, which laid out a clear, incredibly thoroughly reasoned opinion indicating why specific allegations are substantive violations. As such, these violations give rise to sufficiently concrete and particular injuries in fact. Stay tuned for a more detailed analysis of her 9/23/16 order. I hope to write more about that case here as I reflect on the year’s developments in privacy law.
I will also write more about this a couple of recent cases out of the E.D. Va, including my insights regarding Thomas v. FTS, which lays out some strong arguments that a statutory damages class action attorney may want to crib. A fun but rocky ride ahead of us is guaranteed…
In Joan Longenecker-Wells v. Benecard Services, Inc., plaintiffs were employees who learned that their personal information, including date of birth, social security number, addresses, etc. which resulted in fraudulently filed tax returns. The Third Circuit dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims, stating that their negligence claims were barred by the economic loss doctrine. The Third Circuit explains:
The District Court held that because Plaintiffs’ negligence claim sounds only in economic loss resulting from the fraudulent tax returns filed with their information, the economic loss doctrine bars their claim. We agree.
Food for thought. Eh? Can we say that a plaintiff, who experiences this grave injustice of losing the benefit of a 5 figure tax return is only sustaining economic loss. I would think that the experience is emotionally draining if not traumatic to know that a fraudster has exploited your key identifying data to extract money that was owed to you.
In contrast, we have Taylor v. Spherion Staffing LLC, et al. No. 3:15-cv-2299 (N.D. Ohio 2015), Ernst v. Dish Network, LLC, et al. No. 1:12-cv-8794 (S.D.N.Y May 27, 2016); Hillson et al. v. Kelly Services, No. 2:15-cv-10803 (E.D. Mich. June 8, 2016). These cases settled and involved allegations of statutory violations. Keep in mind that Spokeo left open the possibility that a statutory violation may involve a sufficient risk of harm to satisfy the concreteness requirement. Thus, settlement may have presented a more attractive alternative than extended litigation about the sufficiency of alleged harms.
Note: This blog post is republished from my Privacy Law Diva blog.